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Abstract
Following the increasing popularity of mobile ecosystems, cy-
bercriminals have increasingly targeted them, designing and
distributing malicious apps that steal information or cause
harm to the device’s owner. Aiming to counter them, de-
tection techniques based on either static or dynamic analysis
that model Android malware, have been proposed. While the
pros and cons of these analysis techniques are known, they
are usually compared in the context of their limitations e.g.,
static analysis is not able to capture runtime behaviors, full
code coverage is usually not achieved during dynamic analy-
sis, etc. Whereas, in this paper, we analyze the performance
of static and dynamic analysis methods in the detection of An-
droid malware and attempt to compare them in terms of their
detection performance, using the same modeling approach.
To this end, we build on MAMADROID, a state-of-the-art
detection system that relies on static analysis to create a be-
havioral model from the sequences of abstracted API calls.
Then, aiming to apply the same technique in a dynamic analy-
sis setting, we modify CHIMP, a platform recently proposed to
crowdsource human inputs for app testing, in order to extract
API calls’ sequences from the traces produced while executing
the app on a CHIMP virtual device. We call this system AUN-
TIEDROID and instantiate it by using both automated (Mon-
key) and user-generated inputs. We find that combining both
static and dynamic analysis yields the best performance, with
F -measure reaching 0.92. We also show that static analysis
is at least as effective as dynamic analysis, depending on how
apps are stimulated during execution, and, finally, investigate
the reasons for inconsistent misclassifications across methods.
1 Introduction
In today’s digital society, individuals rely on smart mobile
devices and apps for a plethora of social, productivity, and
work activities. Inevitably, this makes them valuable targets
for cybercriminals, thus, more and more malware are devel-
oped every year exclusively targeting mobile operating sys-
tems [11] and, given its market share [34], Android in partic-
ular. Compared to malicious software on desktops, malicious
apps pose new threats as attackers might be able to, e.g., defeat
two-factor authentication of banking systems [39] or continu-
∗A preliminary version of this paper appears in the Proceedings of 16th Annual Con-
ference on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST 2018). This is the full version.
ously spy on victims through their phone camera or micro-
phone [38].
As a result, the research community has proposed a number
of techniques to detect and block Android malware based on
either static or dynamic analysis. With the former, the code
is recovered from the apk, and features are extracted to train
machine learning classifiers; with the latter, apps are executed
in a controlled environment, usually on an emulator or a vir-
tual device, via a real person or an automatic input generator
such as Monkey [18]. In particular, a few approaches have
been recently proposed aiming to improve accuracy of mal-
ware detection. (1) Behavioral Modeling: Mariconti et al.’s
MAMADROID [26] builds from static analysis, a behavioral
model of malware samples, relying on the sequences of ab-
stracted API calls; this yields higher accuracy than state of the
art, while also providing higher resilience to API changes and
reducing the need to re-train models. (2) Input Generators:
previous work [4, 9, 24] has introduced input generators that
aim to mimic app usage by humans, more effectively than the
standard Android pseudorandom input generator (Monkey),
thus improving the chances of triggering malicious code dur-
ing execution. (3) Hybrid Analysis: by combining static and
dynamic analysis, hybrid analysis has been used to try and get
the best of the two worlds, typically, following two possible
strategies. One approach is to use static analysis to gather
information about the apps under analysis (e.g., intent filters
an app listens for, execution paths to specific API calls, etc.)
and then ensuring that all execution paths of interest are trig-
gered during the dynamic analysis stage [9, 40]; in the other,
features extracted using static analysis (e.g., permissions, API
calls, etc.) are combined with those from dynamic analysis
(e.g., file access, networking events, etc.), and used to train an
ensemble machine learning model [22, 23].
Motivation. Overall, despite a large body of work proposing
various Android malware detection tools, the research com-
munity’s stance on whether to use static or dynamic analysis
primarily stems from the systems limitations and the vulnera-
bilities to possible evasion techniques faced by each approach.
For instance, static analysis methods that extract features from
permissions requested by apps often yield high false positive
rates, since benign apps may actually need to request permis-
sions classified as dangerous [15], while systems that perform
classification based on the frequency of API calls [1] often
require constant retraining; moreover, reflection and dynamic
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code loading can be used to evade static analysis based detec-
tion. On the other hand, the accuracy of dynamic analysis is
greatly dependent on whether malicious code is actually trig-
gered during test execution, and in general, dynamic analysis
often does not scale. Nonetheless, we still lack a deep under-
standing of the advantages and disadvantages of each method
in terms of simple detection performance.
Roadmap. In this paper, we aim to fill this research gap by
addressing the following research questions:
1. Can we extend malware detection techniques based on
behavioral modeling (in static analysis, as per MA-
MADROID [26]) to dynamic analysis?
2. How do different malware analysis methods (i.e., static,
dynamic, and hybrid analysis) compare to each other, in
terms of detection performance, when the same technique
is used to build malware detection models?
3. Does having humans test apps during dynamic analysis
improve malware detection compared to pseudorandom
input generators such as Monkey [18]?
Aiming to answer these questions, we first of all modify
CHIMP [2], a platform allowing to crowdsource human inputs
to test Android apps, to support building a behavioral model
based malware detection system (as per MAMADROID [26]).
That is, we use the same approach as MAMADROID to ex-
tract sequences of abstracted API calls from the traces pro-
duced while executing the app in a virtual device (instead of
the apk). We call this system AUNTIEDROID and instantiate it
by using both automated (Monkey) and user-generated inputs.
Then, we evaluate each analysis method, using the same mod-
eling approach (i.e., a behavioral model relying on Markov
chains built from the sequences of abstracted API calls), the
same features, and the same machine learning classifier.
Contributions. Overall, we make several contributions. First,
we introduce AUNTIEDROID, a virtual device that extends
CHIMP [2] and allows for the collection of the method traces
(from which features are extracted) produced by an app when
executed. Second, we build and evaluate a hybrid system com-
bining behavioral-based static and dynamic analysis features.
Third, we show that dynamic code loading is prevalent in the
wild, which could possibly be used by malware developers to
evade static analysis. Finally, we compare the different meth-
ods, showing that hybrid analysis performs best and that static
analysis is at least as effective as dynamic analysis.
Paper Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as
follows. Next section reviews previous work on Android mal-
ware detection. Then, in Section 3, we describe our modifica-
tions to CHIMP that enable its use for Android malware de-
tection. In Section 4, we introduce our experimental setup and
the datasets used for evaluation. Next, we present and com-
pare the results achieved by all methods in Sections 5 and 6,
respectively. Finally, the paper concludes in Section 7. (In the
Appendix, we also discuss challenges with our dynamic anal-
ysis efforts and the limitations of our virtual device testbed.)
2 Related Work
We now review previous work on Android malware detection
using static, dynamic, and hybrid analysis.
2.1 Static Analysis
Android malware detection based on static analysis aims to
classify an app as malicious or benign by relying on features
extracted from the app’s apk, i.e., its source code. Techniques
presented in [15, 19, 32, 33] build features from the permis-
sions requested by the apps, leveraging the fact that malware
often tend to request dangerous/unneeded permissions. This
approach, however, may be prone to false positives, as benign
apps may also request dangerous permissions [15]. Moreover,
since Android 6.0, the permission model allows users to grant
permissions at run-time when they are required, thus some
dangerous permissions might never actually be granted (in
fact, app developers often request permissions that are never
used [17]). Drebin [6] combines several features extracted
from the apps’ manifest (e.g., intents, hardware components,
app components) as well as disassembled code (restricted and
suspicious API calls, and network addresses) to train a classi-
fier. Alas, techniques based on decompiled code can be evaded
using dynamic code loading, reflection, and the use of native
code [28, 30].
Other tools rely on API calls. DroidAPIMiner [1] performs
classification based on the API calls more frequently used by
malware. However, due to changes in the Android API, as well
as the evolution of malware, this requires frequent retraining of
the system as new API versions are released and new types of
malware are developed. Deprecation and/or addition of API
calls with new API releases is quite common, and this might
prompt malware developers to switch to different API calls.
Also based on static analysis is MAMADROID [26], which
uses behavioral models built from the sequences, rather than
the frequency, of API calls. Specifically, it operates by charac-
terizing the transitions between different API calls, involving
the following four stages: (1) It extracts the call graph of an
app, i.e., the control flow graph of the API calls in the apk;
(2) It parses the call graph as sequences of API calls, which
are abstracted to one of two modes, to either their “family” or
package names. In package mode, an API call is abstracted to
its package name using the list of around 338 packages from
the Android and Google APIs, whereas in family mode, to
the google, java, javax, android, xml, apache, junit,
json, or dom families. Obfuscated and developer specific API
calls are abstracted to obfuscated and self-defined, re-
spectively; (3) Next, it models the sequences of (abstracted)
calls as Markov chains, and extracts as features, the transition
probabilities between states; and finally (4) it trains a machine
learning classifier geared to label samples as benign or mali-
cious.
MAMADROID achieves high detection accuracy (up to 0.99
F1-score), and preserves it for longer periods of time com-
pared to [1], as it builds models that are more resilient to API
changes and malware evolution. In this paper, for the static
analysis part, we build on MAMADROID, re-using the source
code publicly available from [27], to perform and compare
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malware detection using a behavioral model built from API
sequences, while using both static, dynamic and hybrid analy-
sis (see Section 4).
2.2 Dynamic Analysis
Dynamic analysis based techniques attempt to detect mal-
ware by capturing the runtime behavior of an app, targeting
either generic malware behaviors or specific ones.
DroidTrace [42] uses ptrace (a system call often used by de-
buggers to control processes) to monitor selected system calls,
allowing to run dynamic payloads and classify their behavior
as, e.g., file access, network connection, inter-process com-
munication, or privilege escalation. Canfora et al. [8] extract
features from the sequence of system calls by executing apps
on a VM, while Lageman et al. [21] model an app’s behavior
during execution on a VM using both system calls and logcat
logs. CopperDroid [37] uses dynamic analysis to reconstruct
malware behavior by observing executed system calls. While
CrowDroid [7], a client running on the device, captures sys-
tem calls generated by apps and sends them to a central server,
which builds a behavioral model of each app. Whereas, we
build a behavioral model of each app from the sequences of
API calls invoked (rather than whether an API call was in-
voked or not) during execution of the apps.
2.3 Hybrid Analysis
A few tools combine static and dynamic analysis, e.g., by
using the former to analyze an apk and the latter to deter-
mine what execution paths to traverse, or by combining fea-
tures extracted using both static and dynamic analysis. Andru-
bis [23] is a malware analysis sandbox that extracts permis-
sions, services, broadcast receivers, activities, package name,
and SDK version from an app’s manifest as well as the ac-
tual bytecode; it then dynamically builds a behavioral profile
using static features as well as selected dynamic ones, such as
reading/writing to files, sending SMS, making phone calls, use
of cryptographic operations, dynamic registration of broadcast
receivers, loading dex classes/native libraries, etc. Note that
although we perform method tracing similar to Andrubis, we
use a virtual device and allow humans (and not only Monkey)
to test the apps, as the latter perform a random sequence of ac-
tions/events which do not necessarily reflect how humans use
the apps and may not trigger certain malicious code. Also,
we build the behavioral profile of the apps from all API calls
observed in the method traces, rather than selected API calls.
Marvin [22] uses features from both static and dynamic
analysis to award malice scores (ranging from 0 to 10) to an
app and classify as malware, apps with scores greater than 5,
while CuriousDroid [9], an automated user interface (UI) in-
teraction for Android apps, integrates Andrubis [23] as its dy-
namic module in order to detect malware. It decomposes an
app’s UI on-the-fly and creates a context-based model generat-
ing series of interactions that aim to emulate real human inter-
action. IntelliDroid [40] introduces a targeted input generator
that integrates with TaintDroid [14] aiming to track sensitive
information flow from a source (e.g., a content provider such
as contact list database) to a sink (e.g., network socket). It al-
Figure 1: High-level overview of AUNTIEDROID. An apk sample is
run in a virtual device, using either Monkey or human. Then, the APIs
called during execution are parsed and used for feature extraction.
Finally, the app is classified as either benign or malicious.
lows the dynamic analysis tool to specify APIs to target and
generates inputs in a precise order that can be used to stimu-
late the Application Under Analysis (AUA) to observe poten-
tial malicious behavior.
Since there are several entry points into an Android app
(e.g., via an activity, service, and broadcast), dynamically
stimulating an AUA is usually done using tools like Monkey
or MonkeyRunner, or humans. Targeted input generation tools
such as CuriousDroid and Intellidroid aim to provide an al-
ternative stimulation of apps that is closer to stimulation by
humans and more intelligent than Monkey and MonkeyRun-
ner.
Finally, we refer the reader seeking more details on the large
body of work on Android malware to useful surveys of An-
droid malware families and detection tools in [3, 16, 36] as
well as an assessment of Android analysis techniques in [31].
3 AUNTIEDROID: Behavioral Model-
ing on a Virtual Device
We now present AUNTIEDROID, a system performing An-
droid malware detection based on behavioral models extracted
via dynamic analysis. Our main objective is to compare
its performance to its static analysis counterpart, i.e., MA-
MADROID [26]. In fact, we build on it, in that we again model
the sequences of (abstracted) calls as Markov chains, and use
the transition probabilities between states as features.
In order to build the behavioral model in dynamic analysis,
we modify a virtual device to allow us to capture the sequence
of API calls from the runtime execution trace of apps. We call
the resulting system AUNTIEDROID, and summarize its oper-
ation in Figure 1. First, we execute apps in a virtual device,
stimulated by either an automated program (Monkey) or a hu-
man. We then parse the traces generated by the executions,
and extract features for classification. The rest of this section
presents the details of each component.
3.1 Virtual Device
As mentioned above, the first step in AUNTIEDROID is to
execute apk samples in a virtual device with either (i) human
users or (ii) an UI automation tool like Monkey [18]. Our
virtual device testbed, described in detail below, builds on
CHIMP, an Android testing system recently presented in [2]
which can be used to collect human inputs from mobile apps.
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CHIMP [2]. CHIMP virtualizes Android devices using the
Android-x86 platform, running behind a QEMU instance on a
Linux server. Although it uses an x86 Android image, CHIMP
actually supports two application binary interfaces (ABI), i.e.,
both ARM and x86 instruction sets are supported. Once run-
ning, the virtualized device can be stimulated by either a lo-
cally running automated tool (e.g., Monkey), or the UI can
be streamed to a remote browser, allowing humans to inter-
act with it. CHIMP can be used to collect a wide range
of data (user interactions, network traffic, performance, etc.)
as well as explicit user feedback; however, for the sake of
AUNTIEDROID, we modify it to generate and collect run-time
traces, i.e., the call graph of an app’s interactive execution.
Modifications to CHIMP. To effectively monitor malware
execution, we substantially modify CHIMP from the proto-
type presented in [2], which was primarily designed to enable
large-scale, human testing of benign apps. In fact, the original
prototype supports code instrumentation via a Java code cov-
erage library called EMMA1, unfortunately, EMMA requires
an app’s source code to be instrumented, which is often not ac-
cessible for closed-source apps such as those analyzed in our
work. Therefore, we modify CHIMP to get access to debug
level run-time information from un-instrumented code. Note
that in Android, each app runs on a dedicated VM which opens
a debugger port using Java’s Debug Wire Protocol (JWDP). As
long as the device is set as debuggable (ro.debuggable prop-
erty), we can connect to the VM’s JWDP port to activate VM
level method tracing.
We also have to activate tracing: in Android, one can
either use Android’s Activity Manager (AM) or the DDM
Service. Both end up enabling the same functionality –
i.e., startMethodTracing on dalvik.system.VMDebug
and android.os.Debug – but through different approaches.
That is, AM (via adb am) exposes a limited API that eventually
reaches the app via Inter-Process Communication (IPC), while
the DDM Service (DDMS, as used by Android Studio) opens a
connection directly to the VM’s debugger, providing fine grain
control over the tracing parameters. We choose the second ap-
proach since it is parameterizable, allowing us to set the trace
buffer size, which by default (8MB) can only hold a few sec-
onds of method traces. Hence, we implement a new DDM
Service in CHIMP, using the ddmlib library [12] to commu-
nicate with the VMs and activate tracing. Our DDM service
multiplexes all tracing requests through a single debugger and
we further modify the ddmlib tracing methods to dump traces
to the VM file system, and set the trace buffer size to 128MB.
However, apps tested on the virtual device can generate more
than 128MB of traces, thus, we add a background job that re-
trieves and removes traces from the VMs every 30s. Besides
preventing the tracing buffer from filling up, this lets us cap-
ture partial traces for apps that might crash during stimulation.
To deal with malware masquerading as legitimate applica-
tions by using the same package names, we uniquely identify
apps based on a hash of the binary, salted with the package
name and a unique testing campaign identifier. This is then
mapped to the app’s storage location on disk. We also modify
1http://emma.sourceforge.net/
CHIMP to disable app verification.
3.2 App Stimulation
As mentioned, to stimulate the AUA, we use both Monkey
and humans.
Monkey [18]. Monkey is Android’s de-facto standard UI au-
tomation tool used to generate inputs. In AUNTIEDROID,
“Monkeys” (i.e., more than one Monkey instance) are de-
ployed on the same machine that the virtual devices are run-
ning on. We set Monkeys to run a single app for 5 minutes (one
virtual device VM per app): each Monkey is setup to generate
events every 100ms and ignore timeouts, crashes, and security
exceptions (although we still log and process them). Setting
Monkey to generate input for 5 minutes only should not ad-
versely affect code coverage, as prior work [10] reports that
most input generators achieve maximum coverage between 5
to 10 minutes. As Monkey may generate events at a higher
frequency than some apps can process, we also re-run offend-
ing apps with a decreased rate (300ms). As discussed in Sec-
tion 4.3, some apps fail to execute, for one of three reasons:
(i) they fail to install, (ii) crash, or (iii) have no interactive el-
ements (e.g., background apps), as observed through logcat
and from the Monkey output itself.
Humans. In order to have real users stimulate the samples, we
recruited about 5k workers (5,030) from the Crowdflower.com
crowdsourcing platform that are “historically trustworthy”.
We let them interact with the virtual device by streaming its
UI to their browser via an HTML5 client. The client transmits
user actions back to AUNTIEDROID, which translates them to
Android inputs and forwards them to the virtual device. In ad-
dition to the virtual device UI, user controls were provided to,
e.g., move to the next app in the testing session.
Each user is given 4 randomly selected apps from our
dataset and told to explore as much of each app’s function-
ality as possible before proceeding to the next app. CHIMP
already provides heuristics to discard users with low engage-
ment, and we do not enforce a lower bound on the time users
must spend testing apps, since given the nature of our sample,
some apps might have limited interaction opportunities. Con-
sequently, we aim to have a median of at least three different
users stimulate each app. In Figure 2(a) and 2(b), respectively,
we plot the CDF of the number of apps each user tests and
the number of times an app is tested. We also limit app in-
stall time to 40s to avoid frustrating the users. We run the test
sessions between August 9th and 11th, 2017 and we pay each
user $0.12 per session.
Ethics. For the experiments involving humans, we have ob-
tained approval through our institution’s ethical review pro-
cess. Although we requested basic demographic data (age,
gender, country), we did not collect privacy sensitive informa-
tion, and users were instructed not to enter any real, personal
information, e.g., account details. No software had to be in-
stalled on participants’ devices: they interacted with the apps
on a webpage, while we collected information about the app
execution in the background. Also note that we provided email
credentials to use when required, so that they did not have to
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution function of the (a) number of apps
tested per tester, and (b) number times apps are tested.
use their own credentials or other contact information.
3.3 Trace Parsing
As discussed above, our virtual device component takes care
of collecting method traces, network packets, and event logs
generated when the app is running. To parse these traces, one
could use different strategies, for instance, tracking data flow
from selected sources (e.g., the device id – getDeviceID())
to sinks (e.g., a data output stream – writeBytes()), or us-
ing frequency analysis to derive commonly used API calls by
malware (as in DroidAPIMiner [1]).
AUNTIEDROID follows the behavioral model based ap-
proach of MAMADROID, based on the sequences of API calls
that the app performs at runtime, rather than statically extract-
ing it from the apk. This way, we aim to capture different
behavior when benign and malicious apps invoke API calls.
For instance, a benign SMS app might receive an SMS, get
the message body using getMessageBody() and afterwards,
display the message to a user via a view by executing, in se-
quence, setText(String msg) and show() methods of the
view. A malicious app, however, might exfiltrate all received
SMSs by executing sendTextMessage() for every message
before displaying it.
To derive the API call sequences, we collect the method
traces and transform them into a call graph using dmtrace-
dump [29]. From the call graph, we then extract the se-
quences using a custom script, while preserving the number
of times an API call is executed as a multiplier in each se-
quence. As discussed above, to avoid losing traces when
the trace buffer is full, we collect virtual device traces ev-
ery 30s, and clear the buffer for incoming traces. Along the
same lines, we have a median of three different users run
the same app to improve the quality of the traces gathered.
As a result, we aggregate the sequences of API calls they
generate for the same app into a single sequence. In Fig-
ure 3, we provide an example of the sequence for the API
call air.com.eni.ChefJudy030.AppEntry.onNewIntent
when aggregated from two other sequences. We do not show
the params and return type to ease presentation. Also, in some
cases, Trace 1 may contain calls in a sequence that is not called
in Trace 2, hence, the aggregated trace also reflects such calls.
3.4 Feature Extraction
As in MAMADROID [26], which operates in one of two
modes i.e., family or package, AUNTIEDROID also abstracts
each API call in the parsed trace to its corresponding family
air.com.eni.ChefJudy030
.AppEntry.onNewIntent
Trace 1
air.com.eni.ChefJudy030
.AppEntry.onNewIntent
Trace 2
air.com.eni.ChefJudy030
.AppEntry.onNewIntent
Aggregated Trace
air.com.eni.ChefJudy030
.AppEntry.InvokeMethod
java.lang.Class.getMethod
android.app.Activity
.onNewIntent
air.com.eni.ChefJudy030
.AppEntry.InvokeMethod
java.lang.Class.getMethod
android.app.Activity
.onNewIntent
air.com.eni.ChefJudy030
.AppEntry.InvokeMethod
java.lang.Class.getMethod
android.app.Activity
.onNewIntent
3
3
3
1
1
1
4
4
4
Figure 3: Aggregated sequence of API
calls showing the direct children of call
air.com.eni.ChefJudy030.AppEntry.onNewIntent, and
the number of times they are called (numbers on the arrow).
and package names using the Android API packages from API
level 26 and the latest Google API packages. The abstraction
allows for resilience to API changes in the Android framework
as packages are added or deprecated less frequently compared
to single API calls. It also helps to reduce the feature set size
as the feature vector of each app is the square of the number of
states in the Markov chain.
Also note that we modify MAMADROID’s method of ab-
stracting API calls: before performing abstraction to packages
or families, we first abstract an API call to its class using a
whitelist approach. We do this to avoid abstracting an API
call to the wrong package or family in case an app prefixes its
package name with one from the Android or Google APIs.
We then build a behavioral model from the abstracted se-
quences of API calls by building a Markov chain that models
the sequences from which we extract features used to classify
an app as either benign or malicious. More specifically, fea-
tures are the probability of transitioning from one state (i.e.,
API call) to another in the Markov chain representing the API
call sequences in an app.
3.5 Classification
Finally, we perform classification, labeling an app as be-
nign or malware using a supervised machine learning classi-
fier. More specifically, we use Random Forests with 10-fold
cross validation. We choose Random Forests since it per-
forms well on binary classification over high-dimension fea-
ture spaces, which is the case with the Markov chain based
model from MAMADROID.
4 Experimental Setup
In this section, we introduce our experiments, the datasets used
in our evaluation, as well as the preprocessing carried out on
them.
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4.1 Overview of the experiments
As discussed in Section 1, we aim to perform a compara-
tive analysis of Android malware detection systems based on
behavioral models, using static, dynamic, and hybrid analy-
sis. To this end, we perform three sets of experiments. (1)
Static: We evaluate MAMADROID, which performs Android
malware detection based on behavioral modeling in static anal-
ysis; (2) Dynamic: We analyze the detection performance of
AUNTIEDROID (see Section 5.2), which uses dynamic analy-
sis, while also comparing automated input generation (Mon-
key) and human-generated input; (3) Hybrid: We combine
static and dynamic analysis by merging the sequences of API
calls from both methods, once again comparing Monkey and
human based input generation.
All methods operate in one of two levels of abstraction,
i.e., API calls are abstracted to either their family or package
names. Overall, we use the same modeling technique and the
same machine learning classifier. More specifically, we use
the Random Forests classifier and in family (resp., package)
mode, we use a configuration of 51 (resp., 101) trees with
depth equal to 8 (resp., 32).
4.2 Datasets
Our evaluation uses two datasets: a collection of recent mal-
ware samples and a dataset of random benign apps, as dis-
cussed below.
Benign Samples. For consistency, we opt to re-use the set
of 2,568 benign apps labeled as “newbenign” in the MA-
MADROID paper [26]. In June 2017, we re-downloaded all
the apps in order to ensure we have working apps and their
latest version, obtaining 2,242 (87%) apps. We complement
this list with a 33% sample of the top 49 apps (as of June
2017) from the 29 categories listed on the Google Play Store,
adding an additional 481 samples. Overall, our benign dataset
includes a total of 2,723 apps.
Malware Samples. Our malware dataset includes samples ob-
tained in June 2017 from VirusShare – a repository of apps
that are likely to be malicious.2 More precisely, VirusShare
contains samples that have been detected as malware on vari-
ous OS platforms, including Android. To obtain only Android
malware, we check that each sample is correctly zipped and
packaged as an apk, contains a Manifest file, and has a pack-
age name. Using this method, we gather 2,692 valid Android
samples labeled as malware in 2017 by the antivirus engines
on VirusShare. In addition, we add two more apps (Chef Judy
and Dress Up Musa) from the Google Play Store reported as
malware in the news and later removed from the play store.3
In total, our malware dataset includes 2,694 apps.
4.3 Data Pre-Processing
Static Analysis. For static analysis, we re-use the source code
of MAMADROID available on bitbucket. We set a timeout
limit of six hours for call graph extraction, and are unable to
obtain the call graphs for 98 (3.6%) and 251 (9.3%) apps in the
2https://virusshare.com/
3https://goo.gl/hBjm0T and https://goo.gl/IQprtP
Failure Benign Malware
Already installed 10 9
Contains native code not compatible with the device’s CPU 0 2
App’s dex files could not be optimized and validated 0 1
Apk could not be unarchived by Android aapt 3 4
Shared library requested by app is not available on the device 0 1
Does not support the SDK (version 4.4.2) on the device 36 6
Requests a shared user already installed on the device 0 1
Android’s failure to parse the app’s certificate 0 4
Fails to complete installation within time limit (40s) 39 23
Total: 88 51
Table 1: Reasons why apps fail to install on the virtual device.
benign and malware datasets, respectively. This is consistent
with experiments reported in [26], due to the timeout but also
to samples exceeding memory requirement (we allocate 16GB
for the JVM heap space).
Dynamic Analysis. During dynamic analysis, before running
the apps on the virtual device, we process them statically using
androguard4 to determine whether they have activities. Out of
the total 5,417 apps in our datasets, we find that 82 apps con-
tain no activity. As interaction with an Android app requires
visuals that users can click, tap, or touch to trigger events, we
therefore exclude these from the samples to be stimulated us-
ing Monkey or humans. We also remove 244 apps that do
not have a launcher activity, since launching these apps on the
virtual device will have no visual effect; i.e., no UI will be dis-
played to the tester. Finally, we do not include 139 apps which
fail to install on the virtual device for one of the reasons shown
in Table 1.
Hybrid Analysis. To obtain a hybrid detection system, we
merge the sequences of abstracted API calls (from which we
extract features) obtained using both static and dynamic anal-
ysis. More specifically, we merge the sequences of API calls
following the same strategy used to aggregate the traces dis-
cussed in Section 3.3. Naturally, for hybrid analysis, we use
samples for which we have traces for both static and dynamic
analysis.
Final Datasets. In Table 2 we report, in the right-most col-
umn, the final number of samples in each dataset, for each
method of analysis. During dynamic analysis, we fail to ob-
tain traces for 724 apps when stimulating with Monkey and
693 when stimulating with humans. We discuss the reasons for
the failure after examining the logs, in Appendix A. This hap-
pens for various reasons, and we defer further analysis to the
full version of the paper Note that the hybrid analysis method
consists of samples for which we obtain traces both statically
and dynamically.
5 Evaluation
We now present the results of our experiments, reporting de-
tection performance and, for dynamic analysis, code coverage.
5.1 Static Analysis
To evaluate the static analysis technique, we use a slightly
modified version of MAMADROID [26]. Also note that,
4https://github.com/androguard/androguard
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Analysis Stimulator Category #Samples #Traces /
Call graphs
Static – Benign 2,723 2,625
(MAMADROID) Malware 2,694 2,443
Dynamic Human Benign 2,596 2,348
(AUNTIEDROID) Malware 2,356 1,911
Monkey Benign 2,596 2,336
Malware 2,356 1,892
Hybrid Static & Human Benign 2,596 2,235
Malware 2,356 1,708
Static & Monkey Benign 2,596 2,234
Malware 2,356 1,686
Table 2: Datasets used to evaluate each method of analysis.
Analysis Stimulator Mode F -measure Precision Recall
Static – Family 0.86 0.84 0.88
(MAMADROID) Package 0.91 0.89 0.93
Dynamic Human Family 0.85 0.80 0.90
(AUNTIEDROID) Package 0.88 0.84 0.92
Monkey Family 0.86 0.84 0.89
Package 0.92 0.91 0.93
Hybrid Static & Human Family 0.87 0.86 0.88
Package 0.90 0.88 0.91
Static & Monkey Family 0.88 0.88 0.89
Package 0.92 0.92 0.93
Table 3: Results achieved by all analysis methods while using human
and Monkey as app stimulators during dynamic analysis.
while [26] uses API level 24, we use the more recent API level
26. We run our experiments on the samples (2,625 benign and
2,443 malware) for which we obtain call graphs, and report the
F -measure obtained when operating in family and package
modes in the top two rows of Table 3. We observe that the
latter performs slightly better, achieving F -measure of 0.91,
compared to 0.86 in the former which is consistent with the
results reported in [26]. The package mode achieves higher
F -measure than family mode as it captures the behavior of
apps at a finer granularity which reveals more distinguishing
behaviors between malware and benign apps as demonstrated
by higher precision and recall (see Table 3).
5.2 Dynamic Analysis
Next, we report the results achieved by dynamic analysis
(i.e., using AUNTIEDROID), comparing between stimulation
performed by Monkey and humans.
Detection Performance. For Monkey, we use the dataset
shown in Table 2, i.e., on 2,336/1,892 samples for be-
nign/malware. When AUNTIEDROID runs in family mode,
it achieves F -measure, precision, and recall of 0.86, 0.84, and
0.89, respectively. Whereas in package mode, it achieves F -
measure, precision, and recall of 0.92, 0.91, and 0.93, respec-
tively, as reported in Table 3. When humans stimulate the apps
(2,348 benign and 1,911 malware) and AUNTIEDROID runs
in family mode, we get F -measure, precision, and recall of
0.85, 0.80, and 0.90, respectively. Whereas when operating
in package mode, F -measure, precision, and recall go up to
0.88, 0.84, and 0.92, respectively (see Table 3).
Overall, lower F -measures in all modes of operation in
dynamic analysis compared to static analysis (i.e., AUN-
TIEDROID vs MAMADROID) are due to increases in false pos-
itives. In fact, recall is around 0.90 on all experiments, while
precision is as low as 0.80 (family mode with humans).
(a) (b)Figure 4: Cumulative distribution function of the percentage of (a)
code covered in benign and malicious apps when they are stimulated
by Monkey and human, and (b) API calls that are dynamically loaded
during dynamic analysis.
Code Coverage. As mentioned, the performance of dynamic
analysis tools is affected by whether malicious code is trig-
gered during execution. Since AUNTIEDROID relies on the
sequences of API calls to detect malware, we analyze code
coverage of each app to measure how much of an app’s API
calls Monkey/humans successfully trigger. Thus, we focus on
API calls that begin with the package name of the app.
For the apps for which we obtain traces (85% and 86%,
resp., for Monkey and human), Monkey is able to trigger on
average, 20% of the API calls. In Figure 4(a), we plot the cu-
mulative distribution function (CDF) of the percentage of code
covered, showing that for 90% of the benign apps, at least 40%
of the API calls are triggered by Monkey. Whereas with re-
spect to the malware samples, at least 57% of the API calls are
triggered. As for humans, we find that users are able to trigger,
on average, 14% of the API calls. Similarly, Figure 4(a) shows
that at least 29% of the API calls are triggered in 90% of the
benign apps. However, with 90% of the malicious apps, 41%
of the API calls are triggered.
With both stimulators, there is a higher percentage of code
coverage in the malware apps than in benign apps. This is
due to malware apps being smaller in size compared to the
benign apps in our dataset. The mean number of API calls
in the benign and malware apps are respectively, 43,518 and
16,780. However, with respect to stimulators, Monkey is able
to trigger more code in apps compared to humans, which is
likely due to Monkey triggering more events than humans in
the time each spend testing the apps.
Dynamic code loading. We also report the percentage of code
that is dynamically loaded by apps by examining the API calls
that exist in the dynamic traces but not in the apk. That is,
we extract the API calls from the apk using apktool [5] and
measure the percentage of the calls that are in the dynamic
traces but not in that extracted statically. We do this to evaluate
the prevalence of dynamic code loading in apps as this could
be used for malicious purposes [28]. For instance, malware
developers may design their apps (or repackage benign apps)
to only dynamically load the malicious code and evade static
analysis tools [35, 43]. In Figure 4(b), we report the CDF of
the percentage of the code that is dynamically loaded, finding
that in 90% of the samples, 97% of the API calls are dynami-
cally loaded irrespective of the app stimulator. As for malware
and benign apps, about 99.5% of the API calls are dynamically
loaded in 90% of malware samples irrespective of the stimula-
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tor compared to about 97% in benign apps. We also evaluate
the percentage of the dynamically loaded code that is common
to all apps to measure whether they are primarily virtual device
or OS operations such as app installation, start/stop method
tracing, os handler etc. We find that only 0.14% and 0.08%,
respectively, are common across apps when the stimulator is
human and Monkey.
Overall, with up to 99.5% of code being dynamically loaded
in 90% of our malware samples, we believe that dynamic code
loading might indeed pose a problem for malware detection
tools based solely on static analysis and dependent on API
calls. That is, these tools might not be resilient to evasion
techniques that load code dynamically, since a large portion
of the executed code will not be examined at all. On the other
hand, with benign apps also heavily employing dynamic code
loading, we cannot conclude that only apps that load a large
portion of their code during dynamic analysis are malicious.
5.3 Hybrid Analysis
We now report the results achieved by hybrid analysis, com-
paring between stimulation performed by Monkey and hu-
mans. Recall that only samples for which we have obtained
a trace in both static and dynamic analysis, as reported in Ta-
ble 2, are merged and evaluated.
In family mode, the hybrid system, using traces produced
by Monkey, achieves an F -measure of 0.88, whereas when
using traces produced by humans, 0.87. When operating in
package mode and using Monkey, it achieves an F -measure
of 0.92, and 0.90 with humans, as reported in Table 3.
Note that we do not report code coverage in hybrid analysis
because the traces from static analysis are an overestimation of
the API calls in the app. Hence, merged traces do not reflect
code covered in each app when executed.
6 Comparative Analysis
We now set out to examine and compare: (1) the detection
performance of each analysis method, i.e., detecting malware
based on a behavioral model built via static, dynamic, or hy-
brid analysis, (2) the samples that are misclassified in each
method, and (3) the samples misclassified in one method but
correctly classified by another. Due to each method having
inherent limitations, it is not clear from prior work how they
compare against each other. Therefore, in this section, we shed
light on their comparisons.
6.1 Detection Performance
We start by comparing the results of the different analysis
methods. Recall that we have abstracted each API call to either
its family or package name, therefore, each method operates
in one of two modes. When operating in family mode, with
static analysis we achieve an F -measure of 0.86, whereas, with
dynamic analysis, we achieve F -measure of 0.86 when apps
are stimulated by Monkey and 0.85 when stimulated by hu-
mans (See Table 3). In package mode, we achieve F -measure
of 0.91 with static analysis, whereas with dynamic analysis we
(a) (b)Figure 5: Cumulative distribution function of the percentage of code
covered (a) when apps are stimulated by humans and Monkey, and (b)
when the correctly classified and misclassified apps are stimulated by
humans and Monkey.
achieve F -measure of 0.92 when apps are stimulated by Mon-
key and 0.88 when stimulated by humans (See Table 3).
The results show that static analysis is at least as effective
as dynamic analysis depending on the app stimulator used dur-
ing dynamic analysis. We believe this is because the behav-
ioral model used to perform detection primarily leverages API
calls. Although static analysis is not able to detect malicious-
ness when code is loaded dynamically, it provides an overes-
timation of the API call sequences in the apk. Consequently,
all behaviors that can be extracted from the apk are actually
captured by the static analysis classifier. On the other hand,
dynamic analysis captures only the behavior exhibited by the
samples during runtime. Hence, any behavior not observed
during runtime is not used in the decision-making of the dy-
namic analysis classifier.
To verify this hypothesis, we evaluate how the percentage
of code covered differs when different app stimulators are em-
ployed as well as in correctly classified and misclassified sam-
ples. From Figure 5(a), we observe that when Monkey is used
as the app stimulator, at least 48% of the API calls are triggered
in 90% of the samples, compared to 35% when they are stim-
ulated by humans. Similarly, as shown in Figure 5(b), 49%
of the API calls are triggered in 90% of the samples correctly
classified when Monkey is used to stimulate apps compared
to 44% of API calls in 90% of the apps that are misclassified.
When humans are used to stimulate the apps, 40% of the API
calls are triggered in 90% of samples that are correctly classi-
fied compared to 38% triggered in 90% of samples misclassi-
fied. As a result of better code coverage, dynamic analysis per-
forms better when apps are stimulated by Monkey compared to
when apps are stimulated by crowdsourced users. Therefore,
we find that, other than the non-susceptibility to evasion tech-
niques such as dynamic code loading, dynamic analysis tools
based on API calls may have no advantage over static analysis
based tools unless the code coverage is improved.
However, when traces from static and dynamic analysis are
merged into a hybrid system, in family mode, we achieve
F -measure of 0.88 using Monkey compared to 0.86 achieved
by both static analysis and dynamic analysis (with Monkey)
alone. Similarly, we achieve F -measure of 0.87 when the dy-
namic traces are generated with humans stimulating the apps
compared to 0.86 and 0.85 achieved respectively by static and
dynamic (humans) analysis alone. In package mode, the hy-
brid system achieves F -measure of 0.92 when the dynamic
traces are produced by Monkey and 0.90 with humans. The
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(a) Humans (b) MonkeyFigure 6: Number of false positives in each analysis method and
when the apps are stimulated by humans (a) or Monkey (b) during
dynamic analysis.
hybrid system outperforms the dynamic analysis system in all
modes (i.e., family and package), as it also captures behav-
ior not exhibited during runtime execution of the apps as a
result of the overestimation from static analysis, while it im-
proves static analysis as it captures frequently used API calls
– a behavior that cannot be captured by static analysis – and
API calls that are dynamically loaded.
6.2 Misclassifications within each analysis
method
Next, we examine the samples that are misclassified in each
method of analysis, aiming to understand the differences in
the model of the correctly classified and misclassified samples.
We perform our analysis on samples that have been classified
by all three methods in package mode.
We formulate and verify the hypothesis that misclassifica-
tions are due to missing API calls that are considered “impor-
tant” by the classifiers. To this end, we select the 100 most im-
portant features used by each classifier to distinguish between
potential malware and benign samples, and evaluate the aver-
age number of these features present in each sample. We select
the 100 most important features because it represents, at most,
about 10% of the features recorded in our experiments. Re-
call that a feature in our detection technique is the probability
of evoking an abstracted API call, and transitions not evoked
during the experiments have probability of 0. The maximum
number of features with probability> 0 in our dataset is 1,869
(static analysis) and the minimum is 1,022 (dynamic analysis
with humans). We expect that samples that are misclassified
will have a similar number of important features as those of
the opposite class.
Therefore, using the top 100 features for each classifier, we
compare the average number of the features in the true pos-
itives (i.e., correctly classified malware samples) to the false
negatives (malware classified as benign), as well as true nega-
tives to false positives.
False Positives. In Figure 6(a) and 6(b), we report the number
of false positives (i.e., benign samples classified as malware)
in each method of analysis, respectively, when apps are stim-
ulated by humans and by Monkey during dynamic analysis.
With the former, there are 215, 317, and 209 false positives,
respectively, with static, dynamic, and hybrid analysis. With
the latter, we get 217, 178, and 137 false positives with static,
dynamic, and hybrid analysis. Using the top 100 features, we
find that the false positives in static analysis exhibit similar
behavior to that observed in true positives. Specifically, they
have, on average, 54.12±22.65 features out of the 100 most
important features, which is similar to 59.96±19.46 in true
positive samples. The same behavior is also observed in both
dynamic and hybrid analysis irrespective of the app stimulator.
In Figure 7, we plot the CDF of the number of features present
in each classification type for all analysis methods when hu-
mans stimulate apps during dynamic analysis and, in Figure 8,
with Monkey. That is, the behavioral model of the false posi-
tives in all analysis methods is similar to that observed on the
true positives. For example, in Figure 7(c) (hybrid analysis)
90% of the false positives have no more than 50 of the 100
most important features (similar to the true positives – 49/100)
while true negatives reach 86 features out of 100.
False Negatives. In Figure 9(a) and 9(b), we report the number
of false negatives (i.e., malware samples classified as benign)
in each analysis method, resp., when apps are stimulated by
humans and Monkey. With the former, there are 148, 151, and
153 false negatives, respectively, in static, dynamic, and hy-
brid analysis, while, with the latter, we get 149, 132, and 126
false negatives. In static analysis, we find that the behavioral
model of the false negatives are similar to that observed in the
true negatives. In particular, of the 100 most important fea-
tures used to distinguish malware from benign samples, there
are, on average, 82.08±11.75 features per false negative sam-
ple. The value is more similar to the 88.91±11.31 important
features per true negative sample rather than the 59.96±19.46
important features per true positive sample. The same result
is also observed in dynamic analysis irrespective of the stim-
ulator, and in hybrid analysis as well. Recall that, in Figure 7
and 8, we plot the CDF of the number of features in each clas-
sification type when, resp., human and Monkey are used as the
stimulator during dynamic analysis; e.g., in Figure 8(b) (dy-
namic analysis), 90% of the false negative samples have 84
of the 100 features, a value more similar to 89 features (true
negatives) rather than 70 features (true positives).
6.3 Misclassifications across analysis methods
Next, we attempt to clarify why some samples are misclas-
sified by one method of analysis but correctly classified by an-
other. The first important difference among the methods is
the code coverage: dynamic analysis does not cover the entire
code base of an app. Moreover, stimulating with Monkey vs
humans yield different code coverage. This might result in a
few different scenarios:
1. Dynamic analysis may not have triggered the malicious
code that is captured in static analysis;
2. Static analysis may reveal sequences of API calls that are
not necessarily malicious, but characterize many mali-
cious apps;
3. API calls not triggered during dynamic analysis may af-
fect the Markov chains leading to training poisoning or
misclassification of the sample, depending on whether the
sample is part of the training or the test set.
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(c) Hybrid Analysis
Figure 7: CDF of the number of features present (out of the 100 most important features) in each classification type for all analysis methods,
with human, during dynamic analysis.
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(c) Hybrid Analysis
Figure 8: CDF of the number of features present (out of the 100 most important features) in each classification type for all analysis methods,
with Monkey, during dynamic analysis).
(a) Humans (b) Monkey
Figure 9: Number of false negatives in each analysis method and
when the apps are stimulated by humans (a) or Monkey (b) during
dynamic analysis.
Scenarios (1) and (2) are possible reasons why static analy-
sis correctly detects some samples and dynamic analysis does
not, while (3) refers to the opposite. Although the hybrid sys-
tem captures sequences of API calls from both static and dy-
namic analysis, it actually results in completely new Markov
chains and features for training and classification. While more
accurate than the individual methods, as the features values
change (i.e., the transition probabilities), it behaves differently.
Another important factor is the presence of loops in the code
waiting for user interaction. A good example are the games
Dumb ways to die 1 & 2. These apps have “minigames” where
a user has to click several times on the right spot of the screen
at the right time. When executed, the apps enter a loop wait-
ing for user action, and decide the next action based on what
happened before returning to waiting for user action. Static
analysis would catch the four different outcomes (i.e., exe-
cution path) of the loop, i.e., wrong click, correct click, the
user won the game, the user lost the game. Dynamic analysis
would repeat the loop many times depending on the continuous
clicks of the human or of Monkey, and the user/Monkey may
never win or lose. Static analysis will record the four possible
loop paths without repeating the sequences in its traces, and
the user/Monkey may not record all the possible sequences,
but have duplicated sequences due to multiple clicks resulting
in the same outcome. All these differences characterize the
recorded traces, and therefore may result in different Markov
chains and decisions among the methods.
7 Discussion & Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed different Android malware detec-
tion analysis methods, i.e., static, dynamic, and hybrid analy-
sis, using a common modeling approach. Specifically, we built
a behavioral model of each sample based on the sequences of
abstracted API calls, as done by MAMADROID [26], as it ef-
fectively captures malicious behavior even in the presence of
changes in the Android API and evolving malware. We then
introduced a dynamic analysis tool, AUNTIEDROID, which
supports app stimulation via both humans (via crowdsourc-
ing [2]) and pseudorandom input generators (Monkey). We
also slightly modified MAMADROID to first abstract an API
call to its class, before abstracting to other modes, to avoid
abstracting to the wrong package. Then, to build a hybrid sys-
tem, we merged the sequences of API calls from static and
dynamic analysis. All three methods operate in one of two
modes, i.e., family and package, based on the level of ab-
straction; in family mode, static, dynamic (human/Monkey),
and hybrid analysis, respectively, achieve F -measures of 0.86,
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0.85/0.86, and 0.88. Whereas, in package mode, we achieve
0.91, 0.88/0.92, and 0.92.
Overall, our experiments showed that hybrid analysis per-
forms best because it captures the best of static and dynamic
analysis, as it is able to capture the sequences of API calls that
are actually executed and/or dynamically loaded (from the lat-
ter), and capture code not executed during testing due to code
overestimation (from the former). Nonetheless, static analy-
sis performs well overall, often better than dynamic analysis;
when looking at misclassifications across methods, we found
that those occurring in dynamic but not in static analysis are
likely due to poor code coverage, thus, the feature vectors in
dynamic analysis may not reveal features (e.g., a chunk of be-
nign code in repackaged samples) that characterize malware
in our dataset. Finally, we showed that dynamic analysis per-
forms better with Monkey than humans because the former is
able to trigger more code than the latter.
Although some characteristics peculiar to AUNTIEDROID’s
virtual device (e.g., it runs as a hardware assisted virtual-
ization) should prevent evasion by malware that tries to cir-
cumvent emulators/virtual devices using environment vari-
ables [13, 20, 25], we plan, as part of future work, to update it
to use a virtual device that appears as close to a real device as
possible. In Appendix B, we also highlight some of its limita-
tions, which we will address in the near future. Moreover, we
intend to use input generators that target specific behaviors of
an app, so as to target certain API calls mostly used by mal-
ware rather than trying to improve the code coverage during
dynamic analysis. Finally, we plan to detect and measure the
prevalence of malware that specifically employs dynamic code
loading as an evasion technique.
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A Challenges With Dynamic Analysis
We now discuss the challenges we faced when analyzing the
apps during dynamic analysis.
Apps with no trace. When executing apps during dynamic
analysis on AUNTIEDROID, we find that, for some apps, we
do not obtain any trace. Specifically, there are no traces for
724 apps when using Monkey and 693 when using humans.
In total, we do not obtain traces for 835 unique apps. Further
examination of the logs of these apps shows that this happens
because:
1. The apps stop responding, i.e., “Application Not Re-
sponding” (ANR) is thrown by Android as the app cannot
respond to user input (154 occurrences);
2. Lack of OpenGL minimum specification matching the re-
quirement of the app (229);
3. Fatal error in an app’s onCreate() launcher activity
method, causing the app to crash (452).
Apps with no package name in apk. For some apps where
we do obtain traces, we find that they do not contain any API
call beginning with the package name of the app. Recall that
in order to evaluate the code coverage of each app, we focus
on API calls that begin with the package name of the app. Us-
ing this approach, we find there are 350 apps in our dataset for
which calls beginning with the package name are not present
in the dynamic traces nor the apk. Upon further analysis, we
find these apps use package names that are different from that
declared in their manifest. To calculate code coverage for
these apps, we use as package names those packages (exclud-
ing packages from the Android and Google API) that have at
least one activity and broadcast receiver and/or service classes
in the apk.
B Virtual Device Limitations
One of the contributions of our work is extending CHIMP [2]
to create a virtual device on which AUNTIEDROID builds; nat-
urally, our work is not without limitations. First, we only sup-
port one Android version at this time: KitKat 4.4.2, however,
we expect KitKat to actually be more vulnerable to malware
than more recent versions of Android; moreover, only 0.8% of
apps in our sample (see Section 4.3) require a newer version
of Android. An interesting future avenue would be to explore
differences in malware behavior across versions of Android,
which previous work showed to be quite significant [41].
Second, our virtual device does not yet support the full range
of OpenGL operations, which somewhat limits the number of
apps that we can evaluate. However, this support is an ongoing
effort by the Android x86 community5 and only 229 (4.6%
of our dataset) of apps that we failed to acquire a trace for
required full OpenGL support. Finally, we remark that, when
stimulating the apps using humans, the users we recruit may
not have tested each app in the way they would have used the
apps on their own device, which is also an item for future work.
5Qemu’s OpenGL 3 support was announced very recently – see http://www.android-x86.
org/releases/releasenote-7-1-rc1
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